If the tort suit is an indirect method for enforcing a contract, infants are liable for their torts

A tort is an act or omission that gives rise to injury or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts impose liability. In the context of torts, "injury" describes the invasion of any legal right, whereas "harm" describes a loss or detriment in fact that an individual suffers.1 

Overview

The primary aims of tort law are to provide relief to injured parties for harms caused by others, to impose liability on parties responsible for the harm, and to deter others from committing harmful acts. Torts can shift the burden of loss from the injured party to the party who is at fault or better suited to bear the burden of the loss. Typically, a party seeking redress through tort law will ask for damages in the form of monetary compensation. Less common remedies include injunction and restitution. 

The boundaries of tort law are defined by common law and state statutory law. Judges, in interpreting the language of statutes, have wide latitude in determining which actions qualify as legally cognizable wrongs, which defenses may override any given claim, and the appropriate measure of damages. Although tort law varies by state, many courts utilize the Restatement of Torts (2nd) as an influential guide. 

Torts fall into three general categories: intentional torts (e.g., intentionally hitting a person); negligent torts (e.g., causing an accident by failing to obey traffic rules); and strict liability torts (e.g., liability for making and selling defective products - see Products Liability). Intentional torts are wrongs that the defendant knew or should have known would result through his or her actions or omissions. Negligent torts occur when the defendant's actions were unreasonably unsafe. Unlike intentional and negligent torts, strict liability torts do not depend on the degree of care that the defendant used. Rather, in strict liability cases, courts focus on whether a particular result or harm manifested. 

There are numerous specific torts including trespass, assault, battery, negligence, products liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. There are also separate areas of tort law including nuisance, defamation, invasion of privacy, and a category of economic torts.

Remedies

The law recognizes torts as civil wrongs and allows injured parties to recover for their losses. Injured parties may bring suit to recover damages in the form of monetary compensation or for an injunction, which compels a party to cease an activity. In certain cases, courts will award punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages to deter further misconduct. 

In the vast majority of tort cases, the court will award compensatory damages to an injured party that has successfully proven his or her case.10 Compensatory damages are typically equal to the monetary value of the injured party's loss of earnings, loss of future earning capacity, pain and suffering, and reasonable medical expenses. Thus, courts may award damages for incurred as well as expected losses. 

When the court has an interest in deterring future misconduct, the court may award punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. For example, in a case against a manufacturer for a defectively manufactured product, a court may award punitive damages to compel the manufacturer to ensure more careful production going forward. 

In some cases, injured parties may bring suit to obtain an injunction rather than monetary relief. The party seeking an injunction typically must prove that it would suffer considerable or irreparable harm without the court's intervention.

Distinguishing Torts from Other Bases of Liability

Torts are distinguishable from crimes, which are wrongs against the state or society at large. The main purpose of criminal liability is to enforce public justice. In contrast, tort law addresses private wrongs and has a central purpose of compensating the victim rather than punishing the wrongdoer.2 Some acts may provide a basis for both tort and criminal liability. For example, gross negligence that endangers the lives of others may simultaneously be a tort and a crime.3 

Some actions are punishable under both criminal law and tort law, such as battery. In that case, ideally tort law would provide a monetary remedy to the plaintiff, while criminal law would provide rehabilitation for the defendant, while also providing a benefit to society by reforming the defendant who committed assault.

Tort law is also distinct from contract law. Although a party may have a strong breach of contract case under contract law, a breach of contract is not typically considered a tortious act.4

Incomplete List of Torts and their Prima Facie Cases (D=defendant; P=plaintiff)

Trespass 

• D had the intent to invade the land
• D invaded land
• P possessed the land and did not give consent to D

Battery

• D acts 
• D intends to cause a contact with P via D’s touch
• D’s touch is harmful or offensive (objective test)
• Causation b/w intentional touch & harm (2b & 2c)
• P does not consent to the touch 

Assault

• D acts
• D intentionally acts so as to cause P to apprehend (not fear) imminent harmful or offensive contact with P
• D’s act causes P reasonably to apprehend (not necessarily fear) such a contact 

False Imprisonment

• D willfully acts . .
•  . . . intending to confine P w/o P’s consent & w/o authority of law
• D’s act causes P’s confinement
• P is aware of P’s confinement

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

• D acts
• D’s conduct is outrageous
• D acts for the purpose of causing the victim emotional distress so severe that it could be expected to adversely affect mental health
• D’s conduct causes such distress

Negligence

• D owed P a duty of reasonable care
• D breached that duty
• P suffers an injury
• D’s breach caused P’s injury

Negligence Per Se

• Statute or administrative created a duty
• P is in class of people protected by the duty statutorily imposed on D
• D violated that statute or administrative regulation
• The Statute was intended to prevent the type of injury suffered

Res ipsa loquitur negligence: P must prove 3 things:

• The incident was of a type that does not generally happen w/o negligence
• It was caused by an instrumentality solely in D’s control
• P did not contribute to the cause

Private Nuisance

• D's action is an intentional non-trespassory activity
• D's action is a recurring activity
• D's action unreasonably interferes w/P’s right to use & enjoy his land

Public Nuisance

• Injury resulting from intentional, unreasonable interference w/right common to the public
• The injury singles out P from the rest of the public

Products Liability

• D sells a product that P uses
• D is the commercial seller of such a product
• P suffers an injury
• When D sold the item, the item was defective
• The defect was an actual and proximate cause of P’s injury

Inducement of contract 

• Valid contract b/w P & third party (a contract that is not currently voided)
• D has knowledge of a valid contract
• D induces third party to disrupt the contract with P
• D’s inducement causes harm to P
• P must show that the inducement was not justified

1. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7
2. Dobbs' Law of Torts § 1
3. See Dobbs' Law of Torts § 1

The general rule is this: minorsBasically synonymous with infant: a young person who may avoid contracts on that account. (or more legalistically “infantsA person who has not reached the age of majority and who may (usually) avoid contracts on that account.”) are in most states persons younger than seventeen years old; they can avoid their contracts, up to and within a reasonable time after reaching majority, subject to some exceptions and limitations. The rationale here is that infants do not stand on an equal footing with adults, and it is unfair to require them to abide by contracts made when they have immature judgment.

The words minor and infant are mostly synonymous, but not exactly, necessarily. In a state where the legal age to drink alcohol is twenty-one, a twenty-year-old would be a minor, but not an infant, because infancy is under eighteen. A seventeen-year-old may avoid contracts (usually), but an eighteen-year-old, while legally bound to his contracts, cannot legally drink alcohol. Strictly speaking, the better term for one who may avoid his contracts is infant, even though, of course, in normal speaking we think of an infant as a baby.

The age of majorityWhen a person is old enough to make his or her contracts unavoidable on account of age. (when a person is no longer an infant or a minor) was lowered in all states except Mississippi during the 1970s (to correspond to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, guaranteeing the right to vote at eighteen) from twenty-one to either eighteen or nineteen. Legal rights for those under twenty-one remain ambiguous, however. Although eighteen-year-olds may assent to binding contracts, not all creditors and landlords believe it, and they may require parents to cosign. For those under twenty-one, there are also legal impediments to holding certain kinds of jobs, signing certain kinds of contracts, marrying, leaving home, and drinking alcohol. There is as yet no uniform set of rules.

The exact day on which the disability of minority vanishes also varies. The old common-law rule put it on the day before the twenty-first birthday. Many states have changed this rule so that majority commences on the day of the eighteenth birthday.

An infant’s contract is voidable, not void. An infant wishing to avoid the contract need do nothing positive to disaffirm. The defense of infancy to a lawsuit is sufficient; although the adult cannot enforce the contract, the infant can (which is why it is said to be voidable, not void).

There are exceptions and complications here. We call out six of them.

First, as an exception to the general rule, infants are generally liable for the reasonable cost of necessities (for the reason that denying them the right to contract for necessities would harm them, not protect them). At common law, a necessity was defined as food, medicine, clothing, or shelter. In recent years, however, the courts have expanded the concept, so that in many states today, necessities include property and services that will enable the infant to earn a living and to provide for those dependent on him. If the contract is executory, the infant can simply disaffirm. If the contract has been executed, however, the infant must face more onerous consequences. Although he will not be required to perform under the contract, he will be liable under a theory of “quasi-contract” for the reasonable value of the necessity. In Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers, an emancipated infant, nineteen years old (before the age of minority was reduced), needed employment; he contracted with a personnel company to find him a job, for which it would charge him a fee. The company did find him a job, and when he attempted to disaffirm his liability for payment on the grounds of infancy, the North Carolina court ruled against him, holding that the concepts of necessities “should be enlarged to include such…services as are reasonable and necessary to enable the infant to earn the money required to provide the necessities of life for himself” and his dependents.

Second, state statutes variously prohibit disaffirmation for such contracts as insurance, education or medical care, bonding agreements, stocks, or bank accounts. In addition, an infant will lose her power to avoid the contract if the rights of third parties intervene. Roberta, an infant, sells a car to Oswald; Oswald, in turn, shortly thereafter sells it to Byers, who knows nothing of Roberta. May Roberta—still an infant—recover it from Byers? No: the rights of the third party have intervened. To allow the infant seller recovery in this situation would undermine faith in commercial transactions.

A third exception involves misrepresentation of age. Certainly, that the adult reasonably believed the infant was an adult is of no consequence in a contract suit. In many states, an infant may misrepresent his age and disaffirm in accordance with the general rule. But it depends. If an infant affirmatively lies about his age, the trend is to deny disaffirmation. A Michigan statute, for instance, prohibits an infant from disaffirming if he has signed a “separate instrument containing only the statement of age, date of signing and the signature.” And some states estop him from claiming to be an infant even if he less expressly falsely represented himself as an adult. Estoppel is a refusal by the courts on equitable grounds to allow a person to escape liability on an otherwise valid defense; unless the infant can return the consideration, the contract will be enforced. It is a question of fact how far a nonexpress (an implied) misrepresentation will be allowed to go before it is considered so clearly misleading as to range into the prohibited area. Some states hold the infant liable for damages for the tort of misrepresentation, but others do not. As William Prosser, the noted torts scholar, said of cases paying no attention to an infant’s lying about his age, “The effect of the decisions refusing to recognize tort liability for misrepresentation is to create a privileged class of liars who are a great trouble to the business world.”

Fourth, when the infant becomes an adult, she has two choices: she may ratify the contract or disaffirm it. She may ratify explicitly; no further consideration is necessary. She may also do so by implication—for instance, by continuing to make payments or retaining goods for an unreasonable period of time. If the child has not disaffirmed the contract while still an infant, she may do so within a reasonable time after reaching majority; what is a “reasonable time” depends on the circumstances.

Fifth, in most cases of disavowal, the infant’s only obligation is to return the goods (if he still has them) or repay the consideration (unless it has been dissipated); he does not have to account for what he wasted, consumed, or damaged during the contract. But since the age of majority has been lowered to eighteen or nineteen, when most young people have graduated from high school, some courts require, if appropriate to avoid injustice to the adult, that the infant account for what he got. (In Dodson v. Shrader, the supreme court of Tennessee held that an infant would—if the contract was fair—have to pay for the pickup truck he bought and wrecked.)

Sixth, the general rule is that infants are liable for their torts (e.g., assault, trespass, nuisance, negligence) unless the tort suit is only an indirect method of enforcing a contract. Henry, age seventeen, holds himself out to be a competent mechanic. He is paid $500 to overhaul Baker’s engine, but he does a careless job and the engine is seriously damaged. He offers to return the $500 but disaffirms any further contractual liability. Can Baker sue him for his negligence, a tort? No, because such a suit would be to enforce the contract.